2007. An Institutional Theory Of Sanctions Onse... -

The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain why sanctions often fail against autocracies but are more effective against democracies:

: Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions against states where they believe the political institutions will make the sanctions effective. 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...

The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition" The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain

Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure. Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the

Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success